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Abstract
We consider a cumulative innovation process in which a follow-on innovator invests
in R&D activities that in°uence both the expected commercial value of the innova-
tion as well as the probability of infringing on the patent of an earlier inventor. We
show that, when the second innovator investments are not observable, ex-ante licensing
agreements are ine®ective and the follow-on innovator fails to invest e±ciently. Because
of this ine±ciency, a large patent breadth may be harmful for the ¯rst innovator too,
and therefore it may be Pareto-dominated. This occurs when a large patent breadth
exacerbates the overinvestment or the underinvestment of the follow-on innovator.
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11 Introduction
In several industries, technical advance does not ¯t the stylized representation of stand-alone
inventions traditionally portrayed by Nordhaus (1969).1 In semiconductors, biotechnology,
aircraft, or computer software technical advance is cumulative and subsequent generations
of innovators build on and interact with technologies provided by earlier inventors. In these
instances, follow-on innovators \stand on the shoulders of giants" that laid down the foun-
dations of the industry (Scotchmer, 1991).
When innovation is cumulative and it is carried out by subsequent innovators, the patent
system has to balance two, potentially con°icting, goals: ensure su±cient rewards to the early
innovators, without, at the same time, discouraging follow-on R&D e®orts. The contribution
to the social welfare of early discoveries is broader than in case of industries with stand-alone
inventions. They are valuable not only per se but also because they enable or facilitate
valuable derived inventions. This externality calls for broad intellectual property rights
to protect early discoveries: in order to align private and social incentives to R&D, early
innovators should obtain a signi¯cant stake in the revenues generated by the innovations to
which they contribute. This can be accomplished by granting the original patent a broad
scope so that infringing subsequent innovators will need to negotiate the permission (license)
of the patent-holder in order to commercialize their discoveries.
However, rewarding early innovators by means of a strong patent protection might un-
dermine future R&D. Anticipating that early innovators are warranted signi¯cant claims on
derived inventions, follow-on innovators may have sub-optimal incentives to perform R&D
activities. This hold-up problem arises especially when inventors sunk speci¯c investments
before negotiating the terms of the licensing agreement with the patent-holder.
Since the surplus on which parties negotiate is represented by the commercial value of
the derived innovation and it does not take into account the costs that have already been
1According to Merges and Nelson (1990) it is worth distinguishing at least four di®erent
industrial patterns of technical advance: discrete (stand-alone) invention model, cumulative
technologies, chemical technologies and \science-based" technologies.sunk (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Scotchmer, 1991; Shapiro, 2001),2 the follow-on inventor
is in a weak bargaining position; in this way, the follow-on innovator might not be able to
obtain a su±cient return on the R&D investment.3
As already explicitly suggested in Scotchmer (1991), parties can mitigate the hold-up
problem by employing ex-ante licensing contracts (or prior agreements), that is by negoti-
ating the licensing agreement before the follow-on innovator has sunk the R&D costs. In
case of an ex-ante agreement, the surplus over which parties bargain is represented by the
commercial value of the derived invention net of the R&D expenditures; in this way, the
costs borne by the follow-on innovator are taken into account in the bargaining process.
In a seminal paper, Green and Scotchmer (1995) formalize this idea and show that,
assuming that parties negotiate in a context of symmetric information, the feasibility of
ex-ante licensing ensures that the follow-on R&D investment always occurs e±ciently. In
this scenario, the only task of the patent policy is to ensure enough rewards to the early
inventor, and this is accomplished by granting her/him a patent with a very large, if not
in¯nite, breadth.
The assumption that ex-ante contracting under symmetric information is feasible has
been repeatedly employed in the subsequent theoretical contributions on cumulative inno-
vation (see O'Donoghue et al., 1998 , Scotchmer, 1996 , and Schankerman and Scotchmer,
2002).4 In two recent papers, Bessen (2004) and Bessen and Maskin (2007) consider the
2According to Shapiro (2001) the hold-up problem represents a real threat to future inno-
vation in several industries. This problem is exacerbated by the lengthy approval process of
Patent O±ces with the danger that new products infringe on patents issued after these prod-
ucts were designed. The concern about these so-called \submarine patents" is particularly
relevant in the software industry, see Graham and Mowery (2004).
3The risk of of slowing down the pace of future innovations is compounded in case of
\patent thickets", that is, when several patents read, at the same time, on a given product
or technology. Patent thickets are common the IT sector (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Siebert
and von Graevenitz, 2006). See also Heller and Eisenberg (1998) for a discussion of the
consequences of patent thickets in the context of biomedical research.
4Matutes et al. (1996) and Chang (1995) do not consider the possibility of ex-ante licenses.
3case where the development costs of the improvement are private information of the follow-
on innovator. The authors show that ex-ante licensing does not guarantee that all e±cient
follow-on innovations occur: at the equilibrium, in some cases the second innovator fails to
invest e±ciently.5
In this paper, we present a model based on Green and Scotchmer (1995) and we obtain
results much sharper than those in Bessen (2004), and Bessen and Maskin (2007). Under
the realistic assumption that when contracting over the licensing terms the early innovator
cannot observe whether the follow-on inventor has already undertaken the R&D activity,
ex-ante agreements are ine®ective. The follow-on inventor bene¯ts from collecting more
precise information about its innovation before entering the licensing negotiations with the
patent holder and this fact always prevents e±cient licensing. In the paper we show that,
at the equilibrium, not only undervinvestment but also overinvesment may occur. The level
of R&D activity of the follow-on innovator has both a commercial e®ect, i.e. it increases the
expected commercial value of the innovation, and an infringement e®ect, i.e. it reduces the
probability of infringing the ¯rst innovator's patent; when the infringement e®ect prevails,
the follow-on inventor may be induced to invest more than the e±cient level.
As a consequence of this ine±ciency in the follow-on level of investment, the pro¯ts of
the patent-holder do not necessarily increase with the strength of patent protection. An
increase in the breadth of the patent improves the probability of infringement but also alters
the incentives to invest of the follow-on innovator. This additional e®ect reduces the pro¯ts
See Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) for a recent review on these issues.
5Siebert and von Graevenitz (2006) formalize the choice of ex-post vs ex-ante licensing
considering the case of n ¯rms simultaneously involved in developing a common technology.
In case of ex-post licensing, ¯rms enter in a patent race: by augmenting its number of
patents, a ¯rm strengthens its bargaining position during the ensuing licensing negotiations.
With ex-ante licensing, de¯ned as agreements \to share future research results prior to R&D
investments", ¯rms avoid the event of a patent race. The authors show that the choice
between reaching an agreement ex-ante or ex-post depends on the strength of the patent
portfolios that ¯rms already have in stock, and on the nature of competition in the product
market.
4of the patent-holder whenever it exacerbates the ine±ciency in the R&D level of the second
innovator.
In the paper, we provide two cases where the overall e®ect of a larger breadth implies less
pro¯ts for the patent-holder. We show that this can occur because the larger patent breadth
exacerbates either the underinvestment or the overinvestment of the follow-on innovator.
These last results are interesting and, in fact, they show that a large patent breadth might
be Pareto-dominated: a too strong patent protection of the initial innovator, may harm not
only the follow-on inventor, but also the patent-holder. This fact is in clear contrast with
the previous literature. Both in Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Bessen (2004) the optimal
patent policy has to balance opposing interests: a larger breadth bene¯ts the early innovator
to the detriment of the follow-on ¯rm. To the contrary, we show that the interests of the
two ¯rms may not necessarily diverge in terms of patent breadth.
Our paper contributes to the current debate about the optimal scope of patents in in-
dustries where innovation is cumulative. As Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) put it, several
arguments in favor of either weak or strong standards for IPR (intellectual property rights)
have been proposed, and the existing literature is inconclusive as to whether broad or nar-
row patents are better suited to encourage innovations. However \one lesson is clear: the
optimal design of IP depends importantly on the ease with which rights holders can contract
around con°icts in rights" (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002 p. 67). In this paper we show that,
under reasonable conditions, the possibility to enter into ex-ante agreements fails to ensure
e±cient follow-on investment. Very broad patents may result in serious underinvestment or
overinvestment that goes to the detriment of all the industry participants.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we outline the model, and in Section 3
we derive the main results of our analysis. Section 4 discusses some of the main hypotheses
at the base of our results and provides some possible policy implications.
52 The Model
We consider a cumulative innovation process in which once the ¯rst inventor, ¯rm 1, patents
its innovation, a second inventor, ¯rm 2, gets an \idea" for an improvement. Firm 2 can
get the idea at any point in time after ¯rm 1 has patented its invention. As we describe
below, ¯rm 2 undertakes some R&D activity in order to develop its idea into a commercially
valuable innovation that might infringe the patent of the ¯rst innovator or not; in case of
infringement, the second inventor has to obtain a license from ¯rm 1 in order to commercialize
its idea.
In what follows, we restrict the analysis to the case in which the overall commercial value
of the two innovations resides in the follow-on invention; that is, the early innovation is
a research tool that has no commercial value per se.6 Moreover, we focus on the second
inventor's behavior being the ¯rst innovation already in place and protected by a patent.
The idea of the second inventor may be more or less promising both in terms of the
commercial bene¯ts that it can generate and in terms of the probability of infringing on ¯rm





are described below. In order to develop the idea, ¯rm 2 undertakes a certain amount of
R&D activity, r ¸ 0 incurring a cost c(r); once the R&D cost has been sunk, with probability
p(r) a \good state" of the world occurs, and with probability 1 ¡ p(r) a \bad state" of the
world occurs. In the analysis we assume that c0(r) > 0, c00(r) > 0, p0(r) > 0, p00(r) · 0.
In the good state of the world, the innovation, i) has a commercial value V G, and ii)
it does not infringe on the patent of the ¯rst innovation with probability ° (b); where b 2
<+ represents the patent breadth set by Government regulations. In the bad state, the
commercaial value is V B · V G, and ¯ (b) is the probability that the follow-on innovation
does not infringe the patent of ¯rm 1, with ¯ (b) · °(b), for any b. In other words, in the
good state the innovation has a larger commercial value and generally a lower probability of
infringing upon the ¯rst innovator's patent.
6Obviously, our arguments apply also to the case in which both innovations have a positive
commercial value but the two innovators serve unrelated markets.
6It is natural to assume that the probabilities of not infringing decrease with the patent
breadth: °0 (b) · 0; and ¯0 (b) · 0.
From this setting it follows that: i) there is a positive relationship between the expected
commercial value and the probability of not infringing of the second innovation, and ii) a
larger r, i.e. a larger R&D activity, increases both the expected commercial value, p(r)V G+
(1 ¡ p(r))V B; as well as the probability that the second innovation does not infringe on the
patent of the ¯rst inventor, p(r)° (b) + (1 ¡ p(r))¯ (b). All through the paper we assume
that an interior solution does exists, that is that the selected amount of ¯rm's 2 R&D r is
such that 0 < p(r) < 1.
2.1 Timing and Information Structure
The timing of the game is as follows:
1: ¯rm 2 gets an idea;
2: ¯rm 2 chooses how much R&D activities to undertake, r, and, afterwards, it observes
the realized commercial value V i; i = G;B and whether its innovation infringes upon
the ¯rst innovator's patent or not;
3: in case of infringement, ¯rm 2 needs to be licensed by the ¯rst innovator. Firm 2 has
two options as to when to negotiate the licensing terms: i) it may ask for the licensing
agreement before having undertaken any R&D activity; or ii) it may choose r ¯rst,
and then asking for the licensing agreement after having observed both commercial
value, V i; i = G;B, and whether the invention infringes or not. In the former case,
we say that the second inventor is looking for an ex-ante licensing agreement while
in the latter we say that it is looking for an ex-post licensing agreement. We assume
that in case ¯rms fail to reach an agreement then, in case of infringement, the terms of
licensing are set by the Court. We assume that the Court observes V i and mandates a
licensing fee ¹ Li; i = G;B; for the sake of simplcity we assume that ¹ Li · V i; i = G;B.
7A crucial aspects of the paper is about the informational structure of the game. In
what follows, we assume that the R&D activity is neither veri¯able nor observable by the
¯rst inventor; in particular, the non-observability of the R&D activity implies that, when
contracting over the licensing terms, ¯rm 1 ignores whether ¯rm 2 has already sunk c(r) or
not. Moreover, we assume that both the commercial value V i; i = G;B and the infringement
of the patent are veri¯able, but only once the second innovation is brought to the market;
namely, the second innovator holds this information privately till the moment it markets its
invention.
3 Results
We start by de¯ning the equilibrium in the licensing agreement.
3.1 Licensing agreement
We assume that the bargaining during the negotiations of the licensing agreement are as
follows:





- ¯rm 1 makes a take-it-or-leave.it proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
: namely a payment ~ Li contingent
on infringement and occurence of outcome i = G;B;
- if ¯rm 2 rejects the proposal, then the fees are those imposed by the Court.
The following proposition highlights the characteristics of the equilibrium of the licensing
negotiations.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, all licensing occurs at the fees implemented by the Court.
Proof. As ¯rst consider the choice of ¯rm 2 once it has asked a licensing agreement, and ¯rm
1 has o®ered a contract
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
; namely a licensing contract that speci¯es a payment ~ Li
contingent on infringement and on the occurence of V i; with i = G;B:
If ¯rm 2 is ex-post and has observed V i it accepts the proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
if and only if
~ Li · ¹ Li: In case ¯rm 2 is ex-ante it will: i) accept any proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ Li · ¹ Li
8i = G;B; ii) reject any proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ Li ¸ ¹ Li; ~ Lj > ¹ Lj, with i = G;B,
j = G;B; and i 6= j; iii) either accept or reject a proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ Li < ¹ Li;
~ Lj > ¹ Lj, with i = G;B, j = G;B; and i 6= j:
Consider equilibria where ¯rm 2 asks for a licensing agreement only ex-post
Consider ¯rm 1. Given that ¯rm 2 is ex-post, then o®ering any
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that
~ LG < ~ LG and/or ~ LB < ~ LB is dominated by
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
; moreover, any proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ Li ¸ ¹ Li; i = G;B yields to ¯rm 1 the same pay-o® as
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
,
since it obtains ¹ Li; i = G;B: Therefore it is optimal to o®er
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
: Given
the proposal of ¯rm 1, ¯rm 2 is indi®erent between going ex-ante or ex-post and between
accepting or rejecting
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
; thus going ex-post and accepting the proposal
is optimal. Therefore we have de¯ned an equilibrium where: ¯rm 2 asks for a licensing
agreement only ex-post and, after observing V i; it accepts the proposal of ¯rm 1 if and only
if ~ Li · ¹ Li; with i = G;B; ¯rm 1 o®ers
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
:
Consider equilibria where ¯rm 2 asks for a licensing agreement only ex-ante
Suppose that, with probability 1 ¯rm 2 chooses to ask for a licensing agreement ex-ante.
The contract
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
that ¯rm 1 proposes solves the following maximization problem:




V G ¡ ~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b))
´
+ (1 ¡ p(~ r))
³
V B ¡ ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
´
¡ c(~ r) ¸
p(¹ r)
¡
V G ¡ ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b))
¢
+ (1 ¡ p(¹ r))
¡
V B ¡ ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
¢
¡ c(¹ r);
where ~ r is the investment level that ¯rm 2 chooses once it has accepted the proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
; while ¹ r is the investment level it chooses after rejecting the proposal, given that
in case of infringement it will pay the licensing fees imposed by the Court
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
:
After some manipulations it is possible to show that the following are the Kuhn-Tucker
condition of the maximization problem:
p(~ r)(1 ¡ ° (b)) + p0 (~ r) @~ r
@~ LG
h
~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)) ¡ ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
i
= ¸p(~ r)(1 ¡ ° (b))
(1 ¡ p(~ r))(1 ¡ ¯ (b))+p0 (~ r) @~ r
@~ LB
h
~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)) ¡ ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
i
= ¸(1 ¡ p(~ r))(1 ¡ ¯ (b))
9¸ ¸ 0; ¸@$
@¸ = 0
This system is satis¯ed for ¸ = 1 and
³
~ LG¤; ~ LB¤
´
satifying the following two conditions:
~ LG¤ (1 ¡ ° (b)) = ~ LB¤ (1 ¡ ¯ (b)); and the participation constraint is binding (i.e. ¯rm 2 is
indi®erent between accepting or rejecting the o®er); the ¯rst condition induces ¯rm 2 to
invest e±ciently, while the second condition just implies that ¯rm 1 extract all the surplus
of the relationship.
As ¯rst note that if
¡¹ LB; ¹ LG¢
is such that ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) = ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)); then the
following is an equilibrium: ¯rm 2 asks for an agreement ex-ante; ¯rm 1 proposes
¡¹ LB; ¹ LG¢
;
¯rm 2 accepts the proposal and invests ¹ r.
Consider now the case where ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) 6= ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)); in what follows we show
that in this case there cannot be an equilibrium where ¯rm 2 asks for a licensing agreement
ex-ante with probability 1. Note ¯rst that when ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) 6= ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)) it cannot
be that either ~ LG¤ = ¹ LG and/or ~ LG¤ = ¹ LB: To the contrary suppose ~ Li¤ = ¹ Li; then: i) if
~ Lj¤ = ¹ Lj; then condition ~ LG¤ (1 ¡ ° (b)) = ~ LB¤ (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) is not satis¯ed; ii) if ~ Lj¤ < ¹ Lj;
then the participation constraint is not binding and ¯rm 1 is not maximizing its pro¯ts; iii) if
~ Lj¤ > ¹ Lj; then the participation constraint is violated and ¯rm 2 rejects the proposal (where
i = G;B; j = G;B and i 6= j). Similarly, it cannot be
³
~ LG¤; ~ LB¤
´
such that: ~ Li¤ < ¹ Li; with
i = G;B since the participation constraint would not be binding; nor it cannot be ~ Li¤ > ¹ Li;
with i = G;B; since ¯rm 2 would reject such proposal. Therefore, the contract
³
~ LG¤; ~ LB¤
´
that ¯rm 1 proposes satis¯es the conditions ~ Li¤ < ¹ Li; and ~ Lj¤ > ¹ Lj; with i = G;B; j = G;B
and i 6= j. However, given the proposal of ¯rm 1, it is not optimal for ¯rm 2 to ask the
licensing agreement ex-ante. By making the investment ¯rst, ¯rm 2 reduces the licensing
fees it pays: after observing V i; it can select the minimum licensing fee between the one
proposed by ¯rm 1 and the one implemented by the Court.
Consider equilibria where ¯rm 2 asks for a licensing agreement ex-ante with
probability ® 2 (0;1) and ex-post with probability (1 ¡ ®)
In order to have ¯rm 2 to be willing to randomize between asking the licensing agreement
ex-ante or ex-post, ¯rm 1's proposal has to be such that ~ Li · ¹ Li i = G;B: However, in what
10follows we show that it is never optimal for ¯rm 1 to o®er a contract
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that
~ Li · ¹ Li; and ~ Lj < ¹ Lj; with i = G;B, j = G;B and i 6= j: This fact implies that two
things might occur: i) either in equibrium ¯rm 1 ¯nds it optimal to o®er
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
=
¡¹ LB; ¹ LG¢
(from the arguments above, this occurs for instance when
¡¹ LB; ¹ LG¢
are such that
¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) = ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b))); ii) there cannot be an equilibrium where ¯rm 2 randomizes
between asking for a licensing agreement ex-ante or ex-post.
Denote with ® 2 (0;1) (1 ¡ ®; respectively) the probability that ¯rm 2 has asked the
licensing agreement ex-ante (ex-post). Suppose that ¯rm 1 proposes
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that
~ Li · ¹ Li; and ~ Lj < ¹ Lj; with i = G;B, j = G;B and i 6= j: Note that such proposal is
accepted by ¯rm 2 both in case it is ex-ante and also in case it is ex-post. The expected
licensing revenues of ¯rm 1 are:
®
³







~ LG; ¹ LG
o
+ (1 ¡ prob(good))min
n
~ LB; ¹ LB
o´
;
where, ~ r is the investment level that an ex-ante ¯rm 2 that accepts
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
will choose;
prob(good) ((1 ¡ prob(good)); respectively) is the probability that ¯rm 2 has asked an agree-
ment ex-post after observing that there is infringement and that V G (V B respectively) has
occurred.
a) Consider a proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ LB = ¹ LB and ~ LG < ¹ LG: If ¯rm 1 were
sure that ¯rm 2 is ex-post then it would prefer proposing a contract
³
~ LG0; ~ LB0
´
with
~ LG0 > ~ LG and ~ LB0 ¸ ~ LB: Therefore, to prove that proposing ~ LB = ¹ LB and ~ LG < ¹ LG
cannot be optimal for ¯rm 1 it is su±cient to check that it prefers to increase either
~ LB and/or ~ LG when facing an ex-ante type. Before entering in the analysis, note that
¯rm 2 that accepts the contract
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
before investing then will solve:
maxr p(r)
h
° (b)V G + (1 ¡ ° (b))
³





¯ (b)V B + (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
³
V B ¡ ~ LB
´i
¡ c(r):
11Taking the derivative with respect to r, it is easy to show that the amount of R&D










(1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ L










² { Let's di®erentiate implicitly the ¯rst order condition (1) with respect to ~ LG and
with repect to ~ LB : @~ r
@~ LG =
p0(~ r)(1¡°(b))
p00(~ r)[V G¡V B¡(1¡°(b))~ LG+(1¡¯(b))~ LB]¡c00(~ r); and @~ r
@~ LB =
¡p0(~ r)(1¡¯(b))
p00(~ r)[V G¡V B¡(1¡°(b))~ LG+(1¡¯(b))~ LB]¡c00(~ r): The second order condition implies that the
¯rst implicit derivative is negative while the second one is positive. If (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG ¸
(1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; ¯rm 1 is better o®ering
³
~ LG; ~ LB + "
´
, so that: the ex-ante type
still accepts the proposal (at the initial contract the participation constraint is
not binding), increases ~ r;so that ¯rm 1 increases the probability of obtaining
(1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG rather than (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; and in case of the bad state of the world
it obtains (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
³
~ LB + "
´
; rather than just (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB: If (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG <
(1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; ¯rm 1 is better-o® by o®ering
³
~ LG + "; ~ LB
´
, so that: the ex-ante
type still accepts the o®er, decreases ~ r and ¯rm 1 increases the probability of
obtaining (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LB rather than (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LG; and in case of the good state
of the world it obtains (1 ¡ ° (b))
³
~ LG + "
´
rather than just (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG: The
previous arguments imply that any proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ LB = ¹ LB and
~ LG < ¹ LG is not optimal for ¯rm 1 when it faces an ex-ante type: it prefers to
increase the fees it asks in at least one of the two states of the world.
b) Consider a proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ LG = ¹ LG and ~ LB < ¹ LB: If ¯rm 1 were sure
that ¯rm 2 is ex-post, then it would prefer proposing a contract
³
~ LG0; ~ LB0
´
such that
~ LG0 ¸ ~ LG and ~ LB0 > ~ LB: Therefore, to prove that ~ LG = ¹ LG and ~ LB < ¹ LBcannot
an optimal it is su±cient to check that ¯rm 1 prefers to increase either ~ LB and/or
~ LG when facing an ex-ante type.
{ as before we know that @r
@~ LG < 0 and @r
@~ LB > 0: Therefore, if (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG ¸
(1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; ¯rm 1 is better o®ering
³
~ LG; ~ LB + "
´
, so that: the ex-ante type
12still accepts the o®er (at the initial contract the participation constraint is not
binding), increases ~ r and ¯rm 1 increases the probability of obtaining (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG
rather than (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; and in case of the bad state of the world it ob-
tains (1 ¡ ¯ (b))
³
~ LB + "
´
: In case, (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LG < (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LB; ¯rm 1 is
better o®ering
³
~ LG + "; ~ LB
´
, so that: the ex-ante type still accepts the o®er,
it decreases ~ r and ¯rm 1 increases the probability of obtaining (1 ¡ ° (b)) ~ LB
rather than (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) ~ LG; and in case of the good state of the world it obtains
(1 ¡ ° (b))
³
~ LG + "
´
: The previous arguments imply that any proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ LG = ¹ LG and ~ LB < ¹ LB is not optimal for ¯rm 1 when it faces an ex-ante
type: it prefers to increase the fees it asks in at least one of the two states of the
world.
c) Similar argument apply for the case ~ LB < ¹ LB and ~ LG < ¹ LG and are omitted for the
sake of brevity.
The intuition of the result is as follows; in case ¯rm 1 is willing to propose a contract
di®erent from the one impemented by the Court, namely some
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
6=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
; ¯rm
2 approaches the ¯rst inventor ex-post in order to select the most favorable licensing fee:
after observing the outcome, in case of infringement, it can choose whether to pay the fee
proposed by ¯rm 1 or that implemented by the Court; however, in case ¯rm 2 is ex-post the
¯rst inventor has no incentive to o®er any
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
6=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
:
The implication of the result is important. The licensing contract cannot improve upon
the fees implemented by the Court and this implies that it cannot be used to ameliorate the
R&D incentives of the second innovator.
3.2 R&D investment and licensing revenues
We want to investigate the optimal R&D choice of ¯rm 2 and how this decision is a®ected
by the patent breadth. From Proposition 1 we know that licensing occurs at the fees imple-
13mented by the Court, namely
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
: In what follows, in order to simplify the analysis
we we will assume that the Court sets the fees proportional to the commercial value of the
innovation: ¹ Li= (1 ¡ ½)V i. The parameter ½ determines how the value of the innovation
is shared across inventors and it might be related both to the bargaining power of the two
¯rms, and to the extent to which Government and Courts favor a more or less pronounced
\pro-patent" environment.
Before determining the optimal amount of R&D activities performed by ¯rm 2, it is useful
to de¯ne the e±cient level of R&D, that is the value of r that maximizes the joint pro¯ts of






















Let us now consider the investment level that the follow-on innovator actually chooses.
Whenever its invention does not infringe the patent of the early innovator, ¯rm 2 bene¯ts
of the full expected commercial value it generates; this occurs with probability °(b) in the
good state and with probability ¯(b) in the bad state. In case of infringement ¯rm 2 gets







G + (1 ¡ ° (b))½V
G¤
+ (1 ¡ p(r))
£
¯ (b)V
B + (1 ¡ ¯ (b))½V
B¤
¡ c(r):
Taking the derivative with respect to r, it is easy to show that the amount of R&D
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This expression has a clear interpretation. A larger level of R&D activity increases
the probability of the good state of the world, and decreases that of the bad state. This
14fact has two e®ects on ¯rm 2's expected pro¯ts. On the one side, given the probability of
infringement, the expected commercial value of the innovation is larger (commercial e®ect).
On the other side, since °(b) ¸ ¯(b), by making the good state of the world more likely, ¯rm
2 reduces the probability of infringing upon ¯rm 1's innovation thus bene¯tting from the
lower expected licensing fees, (1 ¡ ½)V B (infringement e®ect). These two e®ects are clearly
highlighted in the left hand side of expression (3). The commercial e®ect is represented by
the ¯rst term into the square brackets and it is proportional to V G ¡ V B. The second term
into the square brackets is proportional to the reduction in the probability of not infringing,
°(b) ¡ ¯(b), and it represents the infringement e®ect.
Comparing expressions (2) and (3) the following result holds:7
Proposition 2. Whenever (1 ¡ ° (b))V G ¸ (1 ¡ ¯ (b))V B, ¯rm 2 underinvests and it over-
invests otherwise.
According to the above proposition there is underinvestment when V G is large relative
to V B and when ° (b) is close to ¯ (b). In other words, ¯rm 2 tends to underinvest when
the commercial e®ect of the R&D activity is large compared to the infringement e®ect; for
instance, if °(b) = ¯(b) the infringement e®ect disappears, and ¯rm 2 invests less than reff
since it does not obtain the full commercial value of its innovation. Conversely, there is
overinvestment when the infringement e®ect dominates the commercial one; for instance,
when V G = V B the commercial e®ect vanishes and ¯rm 2 overinvests.




, there is a level b > 0 such that
the commercial and the infringement e®ects balance each other, and ¯rm 2 is induced to
invest e±ciently. Nevertheless, since the patent breadth is set by the Government before the
idea is extracted, then the probability that the selected b induces the e±cient R&D activity
is null. Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 make clear that the inability of ¯rm 1 to observe
whether ¯rm 2 has already undertaken its R&D activities or not prevents that the licensing
of the ¯rst innovation to occur e±ciently.
7The Proof of this and of the following propositions are in the Appendix.
153.2.1 Patent breadth and R&D investment
We are now in the position to analyse the e®ect of a larger breadth on the investment
incentives of the follow-on innovator. Expression (3) implicitly de¯nes the optimal investment
level as a function of the patent breadth, r¤(b). Using the implicit function theorem we can






V G ¡ V B¢
°0 (b)(1 ¡ ½) + (°0 (b) ¡ ¯0 (b))V B¡
1 ¡ ½)]
¡p00(r)[(V G ¡ V B)(° (b) + (1 ¡ ° (b))½) + (° (b) ¡ ¯ (b))V B (1 ¡ ½)] + c00 (r)
: (4)
The sign of this expression coincides with that of the numerator; more speci¯cally, the
numerator represents the marginal variation of the commercial and the infringement e®ect
(the ¯rst and the second term into the square brackets, respectively). Consider the commer-
cial e®ect; an increase in b reduces the commercial value that ¯rm 2 appropriates, and this
induces the follow-on innovator to invest less in R&D activities: at the margin the commer-
cial e®ect decreases with r. The impact of a larger b on the infringement e®ect is in general
indeterminate. When °0 (b) ¡ ¯0 (b) > 0, then as b gets larger the di®erence between °(b)
and ¯(b) also increases; therefore, according to the infringement e®ect, ¯rm 2 is induced to
invest more. When °0 (b) ¡ ¯0 (b) < 0 the opposite occurs.
3.2.2 Firm 1's licensing revenues
Under the assumption that the ¯rst innovation is a research tool, ¯rm 1's pro¯ts coincide
with the licensing revenues it gets from the follow-on innovator. It is interesting to evaluate
how these revenues change with the breadth of the patent.
From Proposition 1 follows that ¯rm 1 obtains a share (1¡½) of the commercial value of
the second innovation whenever there is infringement; formally, ¯rm 1's licensing revenues
are given by:
¦1 (b) = (1 ¡ ½)
£
p(r
¤)(1 ¡ ° (b))V
G + (1 ¡ p(r
¤))(1 ¡ ¯ (b))V
B¤
With probability p(r¤) the good state of the world occurs; in this case the follow-on in-
novation infringes on ¯rm 1's patent with probability (1 ¡ ° (b)). Similarly, with probability
16(1 ¡ p(r¤)) the bad state occurs and there is infringement with probability (1 ¡ ¯ (b)). In
both cases ¯rm 1 obtains a share (1 ¡ ½) of the commercial value.
The impact of a variation in patent protection on the ¯rst innovator's pro¯ts is obtained
by simple di®erentiation of ¦1 (b):
@¦1 (b)
@b





























As shown above, the e®ect of a larger b on ¦1 depends on the combination of two e®ects,
a direct and an indirect one. On the one hand, given the investment level chosen by ¯rm 2,
the revenues of the ¯rst innovator get larger due to the increased probability of infringement;
this is the direct e®ect of an enlarged patent breadth and it has a positive sign. On the other
hand, an increase of b alters the investment incentives of ¯rm 2: this is the indirect e®ect,
namely the e®ect mediated by the change in r¤; since the change in the R&D investment
a®ects both the expected commercial value of the second innovation and the probability of
infringement,8 the indirect e®ect can be decomposed into two further e®ects.
In general, the indirect e®ect has an indeterminate sign and it can either increase or
decrease the licensing revenues of ¯rm 1. However, it is worth noticing that the following
result holds.
Proposition 3. The indirect e®ect is negative whenever a larger patent breadth increases
the ine±ciency of the R&D investment of ¯rm 2.
8Note that to disentangle the double e®ect of the change in r¤ on the expected commercial








V G ¡ V B¢
+ (°(b) ¡ ¯(b))V B¢
.
17As proved in Proposition 3, the indirect e®ect reduces ¯rm 1's revenues in two cases: i)
when ¯rm 2 is underinvesting and the increase in the patent breadth induces a further reduc-
tion of the investment; ii) when ¯rm 2 is overinvesting and a larger b causes the investment
to increase even further.
Obviously, the indirect e®ect is positive and it goes in the same direction of the direct
one whenever a larger b induces a reduction in the ine±ciency of ¯rm 2 R&D investment.
3.2.3 Simpli¯ed cases
In this section we provide two simpli¯ed scenarios whereby we show that the ¯rst innovator
can indeed be harmed by a too broad and strong patent protection. Formally, we present
two cases where the indirect e®ect is negative and of su±cient magnitude so that it more
than compensate the direct e®ect. In both cases we assume that:
(A.1) p(r) = r, and c(r) = r2
2 ;
(A.2) ¯0(b) < 0, and limb!1 ¯(b) = x; with x su±ciently close to zero.
Case 1: no infringement e®ect (°(b) = ¯(b)). In what follows we assume the probabil-
ities of non-infringement are the same in the two states of the world, namely ° (b) = ¯ (b);
for any b: In this case the infringement e®ect shown in expressions (3) and (4) disappears
and, ¯rm 2 investment decision is driven only by the commercial e®ect.
Absent the infringement e®ect, from the previous analysis it follows that:
- ¯rm 2 invests less than reff (see Proposition 2);
- r¤ decreases with b (see expression (4)), and therefore ¯rm 2's underinvestment becomes
more severe a,s the patent breadth increases;
- the indirect e®ect is negative (see Proposition 3).
In this simpli¯ed setting the following result holds:
18Proposition 4. Assume that (A.1), (A.2) hold and that °(b) = ¯(b) for all b; if ½ < 1
2; then
for any V G such that 8V G > V B +
p
V B(1¡2½)
(1¡2½) there exists a ^ b such that ¯rm 1's pro¯ts are
decreasing for any b > ^ b:
The above Proposition shows that ¯rm 1 may be harmed when its invention is protected
by a patent with a too broad scope. The intuition for this result is the following: a large b
exacerbates the underinvestment problem, and this further reduces the value generated by
the second innovator, part of which goes to the bene¯t of ¯rm 1 through the licensing fees.
Therefore, ¯rm 1 may be harmed by an increase in the patent breadth because of the smaller
commercial value generated by the second innovation. Indeed, as shown in the proof, the
(positive) direct e®ect on ¯rm 1's pro¯ts shrinks as b gets larger, given that r¤ decreases with
the patent breadth; therefore, for large values of b the (negative) indirect e®ect prevails.
Case 2: no commercial e®ect and strong infringement e®ect V G = V B and °(b) = 1.
When V G = V B, the commercial e®ect shown in expressions (3) and (4) vanishes and the
likelihood of infringement is determined only by ¯rm 2's R&D investment. On top of that,
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that infringement never occurs in the good state of the
world, formally °(b) = 1 for any b:
Absent the commercial e®ect, from the previous analysis it follows that:
- reff = 0, and ¯rm 2 overinvests (see Proposition 2);
- the marginal infringement e®ect is positive (°0(b)¡¯0(b) = ¡¯0(b) > 0) and r¤ increases
with b so that ¯rm 2's overinvestment becomes more severe as the patent breadth
increases (see expression (4));
- the indirect e®ect is negative (see Proposition 3).
In this simpli¯ed setting the following result holds:
19Proposition 5. Assume that (A.1), (A.2) hold and that V G = V B and °(b) = 1, then for
all V G such that V G > 1
2(1¡½) there exists a ^ b such that ¯rm 1's pro¯ts are decreasing for any
b > ^ b:
In this case, a larger patent breadth may harm ¯rm 1 given that it might reduce the
probability of infringement without altering the expected commercial value of the second
innovation: as b grows, ¯rm 2 increases its R&D and this has the e®ect to reduce the
probability of infringement with no e®ect on the value it creates.
In particular the above remark shows that there exists a threshold level for b such that
¯rm 1 pro¯ts decrease as the patent breadth grows larger than the threshold. Indeed, the
direct e®ect (¡¯0(b)(1 ¡ r¤)(1 ¡ ½)V G) decreases with b, given that the patent breadth
increases r¤. Therefore, for large values of b the indirect e®ect more than compensate the
direct one and ¯rm 1's pro¯ts decrease with the patent protection.
3.3 Firm 1 moves as ¯rst
Proposition 1 makes it clear that all licensing occurs at the fees implemented by the Court.
This implies that the licensing contract is not useful in order to improve the R&D incentives
of the second innovator, and that, in general, the investment of ¯rm 2 is ine±cient. What
prevents ¯rm 1 to propose a "more e±cient" contract is that if it does so ¯rm 2 comes ex-post,
and, at this stage, the ¯rst inventor prefers not to o®er a contract
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
6=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
: if
¯rm 2 is ex-post there is no investment to be incentivated and threfore ¯rm 1 is better-o®
just o®ering
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
.
Consider now the following scenario: at time t = 0, just after innovating, ¯rm 1 has the
possibility to commit to a licensing scheme e.g. it can announce through the internet the
conditions under which it is willing to license its invention. Note that at t = 0, ¯rm 1 knows
for sure that ¯rm 2 has not got its idea, and therefore it has not invested yet; this means
that ¯rm 1 could ¯nd it pro¯table to propose
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
6=
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
in order to give more
appropriate R&D incentives to ¯rm 2.
20Of course there are di®erent practical reasons why in reality ¯rm 1 does not make such
a proposal:
- ¯rm 1 is unable to describe all the possible future applications/ideas of its invention. If
it could then it would be able to carry out these applications on its own;





: This means that it can o®er an "average" contract,
and this might not be pro¯table if there is high heterogeneity for instance in the cost or
probability functions of the ideas.
Even though it is not the aim of this paper to determine under which circumstances it
is optimal for ¯rm 1 to commit to a licensing scheme just after obtaining its innovation,
we show that also in a very extreme scenario whereby ¯rm 1 knows the idea of the second
innovator, the licensing contract cannot be e±cient.





: The following Proposition shows that also in
this case there cannot be e±cient licensing
Proposition 6. E±ciency in licensing agreement is not restored even in the case where ¯rm
1 has the possibility to commit to a licensing scheme at t = 0.
Proof. Consider the case where ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) 6= ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)): Note that whatever the pro-
posal of ¯rm 1, ¯rm 2 has the possibility of choosing an ex-post strategy in order to pay the
minimum between ~ Li and ¹ Li; therefore, we can restrict to the case where ¯rm 1 announces
a proposal
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
such that ~ Li · ¹ Li; i = G;B: In order to induce an e±cient investment
³
~ LG; ~ LB
´
has to be such that ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) = ~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)); in this case, ¯rm 1 obtains
an expected licensing revenue ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) = ~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)): Note that, from the previ-
ous arguments the following two inequalities are veri¯ed ~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) · ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b));
~ LG (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) · ¹ LG (1 ¡ ¯ (b)); and in the case where ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) 6= ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)); at
least one holds with the strict inequality sign. However, this fact implies that ¯rm 1 would
be better-o® making no o®er and obtaining p(¹ r) ¹ LG (1 ¡ ° (b))+(1 ¡ p(¹ r)) ¹ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) >
21~ LB (1 ¡ ¯ (b)) = ~ LG (1 ¡ ° (b)); provided that p(¹ r) 2 (0;1); where ¹ r is the investment level
of ¯rm 2 when it pays a licensing fee
¡¹ LG; ¹ LB¢
:
The intuition of the result is as follows. Once ¯rm 1 has committed to a licensing scheme,
¯rm 2 has always the option of going ex-post. This means that, in case of infringment ¯rm
2 does not pay more than ¹ Li; i = G;B. By o®ering the e±cient contract ¯rm 2 obtains to
little and would prefer not to o®er any contract.
4 Final Remarks and Policy Implications
Recent theoretical contributions on the economics of sequential innovation have stressed the
merits of ex-ante licensing in order to curb the risk that future inventions are held-up by
patents protecting existing technologies. Notably, Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that, in
a context of symmetric information, there is no hold-up in case the follow-on innovator has
the possibility to negotiate the licensing agreement with the patent-holder before incurring
the R&D costs.
In this paper we have extended the model of Green and Scotchmer (1995) and we have
shown that ex-ante agreements are ine®ective in case the ¯rst innovator is unable to observe
whether the follow-on inventor has already undertaken its R&D activities. The follow-
on inventor is better-o® by collecting more precise information about its innovation before
negotiating the licensing agreement and this fact prevents e±cient licensing. In the paper
we have assumed that the second inventor observes the commercial value of its innovation
just after having sunk the R&D investment; however, intuitively, the arguments behind
Proposition 1 hold also in case the second inventor, once incurred the R&D expenditures,
simply obtains a signal about the commercial value of its innovation which is more precise
than the initial idea.9
9Note that in the paper we also assume that, after choosing r, ¯rm 2 observes whether
there is infringement or not. This assumption does not distort the result of Proposition 1
given that parties, at any time, can write a licensing contract stipulating that the fee is
payable contingent on infringement.
22An important consequence of the ine±cient licensing is that the pro¯ts of the ¯rst inventor
do not necessarily increase with the breadth of the patent that protects its innovation.
Indeed, even though an enlarged patent protection increases the likelihood of infringement
it also alters the incentives to invest of the follow-on inventor. This latter, indirect, e®ect of
a larger patent breadth might go to the detriment of the ¯rst inventor; we have shown that
this occurs whenever the increase in the patent protection exacerbates the ine±ciency in the
R&D of the second innovator.
In the paper we provide two simpli¯ed scenarios whereby we show that the ¯rst inventor
is actually damaged by a too broad patent protection. This fact might occur because a large
patent breadth may either i) reduce the incentives to invest of the second innovator and
thus lower the commercial value of its innovation, part of which goes to the bene¯t of the
¯rst innovator through licensing (Proposition 4), or ii) it may induce the second innovator
to overinvest in order to reduce the probability of infringement (Proposition 5).
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the ¯rst and the second innovations/inventors
are not rivals; nonetheless, it would be possible to show that, qualitatively, our main results
hold also when the ¯rst innovation has a commercial value and the follow-on invention steals
the business of the initial inventor. A result similar to that of Proposition 4 may also oc-
cur when the follow-on innovation/product \increases substantially the willingness to pay of
consumers" e.g. because it markets a product of superior quality or, in case of industries
with network externalities, because it enlarges the size of the installed base of products. In
this scenario, a large patent breadth reduces the incentives to invest of the second innovator
and the early inventor may be harmed exactly for the same reason as in Proposition 4.10
Similarly, in case the R&D investment a®ects only the probability of infringement but
not the quality of the product with which ¯rm 1 competes, a large patent breadth may be
harmful for the early inventor because of the same reason as in Case 2.
10It is well known that in markets characterized by network e®ects, an incumbent provider
may prefer to face a compatible rival rather then acting monopolistically; the presence of the
rival enlarges the installed base of adopters and this may go to the bene¯t of the incumbent
through the larger network e®ects (Economides, 1996).
23Policy Implications. Our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on the e®ects of
(strong) intellectual property rights in industries where innovation is sequential. As we
have made it clear, whenever the follow-on inventor has the possibility to conceal some
relevant information about its invention, the availability of ex-ante contracts is ine®ective
and licensing agreements are ine±cient. This result rests on the assumption that both
the amount of the R&D investment of the second inventor, and when such investment is
undertaken are not observable. This assumption seems plausible, especially if one thinks to
industries such as software, hardware and more broadly to high-tech sectors, where large
part of R&D is made of intellectual activities aimed at knowledge creation; the very nature
of these activities is clearly intangible and therefore of more di±cult measurement.
Even though a careful analysis of the optimal patent breadth goes beyond the scope of
this paper, it is interesting to note that the ine±ciency at the licensing stage implies that the
patent breadth does not only in°uence the division of pro¯ts among di®erent innovators, but
also the overall amount. In particular, we have shown that the ine±ciency at the licensing
stage might be so substantial that a large patent breadth may actually be Pareto-dominated
in that it may harm the ¯rst inventor too. This implies that it might be in the mutual
interest of the two innovators to have a lighter patent protection.
Interestingly, we show that at the equilibrium not only underinvestment but also overin-
vestment might occur. There is overinvestment when the R&D e®orts reduce the probability
of infringement without substantially a®ecting the value of the innovation; this amounts
to saying that the follow-on innovator spends resources in order to design around existing
products. This is obviously ine±cient since it represents a mere duplication of e®orts. The
software industry represents a clear example of an industry where this is frequently the case:
very often, commercial ¯rms prefer to re-write from scratch modules or lines of codes in-
stead of using the already existing ones just to avoid patent infringement. In this case, a
clear overinvestment occurs: the duplication of the lines of code does not add value but it
decreases the probability of infringement.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that V G ¡ V B ¸
¡
V G ¡ V B¢
(° (b) + (1 ¡ ° (b))½) + (° (b) ¡ ¯ (b))V B (1 ¡ ½) if and
only if (1 ¡ ° (b))V G ¸ (1 ¡ ¯ (b))V B; in this case, reff ¸ r¤ from the assumptions p00(r) · 0
and c00(r) > 0. Similarly, (1 ¡ ° (b))V G < (1 ¡ ¯ (b))V B implies reff < r¤.
Proof of Proposition 3






(1 ¡ °(b))V G ¡ (1 ¡ ¯(b))V B¢
and it is negative ei-
ther when
¡
(1 ¡ °(b))V G > (1 ¡ ¯(b))V B¢
and @r¤
@b < 0 or when
¡
(1 ¡ °(b))V G < (1 ¡ ¯(b))V B¢
and @r¤
@b > 0:
Proof of Proposition 4
Straightforward calculations yield r¤ =
¡
V G ¡ V B¢
(¯(b) + (1 ¡ ¯(b))½); and
@¦1(b)
@b = ¡¯0(b)(1 ¡ ½)
¡¡
V G + V B¢




(1 ¡ ¯(b))(1 ¡ ½)
¡
V G ¡ V B¢¤
: After
some manipulations it is possible to show that
@¦1(b)
@b < 0 if and only if !
¡
V G¢2 ¡ !V G +
!
¡
V B¢2 ¡ V B > 0; where ! = 1 + 2(½¯(b) ¡ ¯(b) ¡ ½): The previous expression has real





with ¯ (and then increases with b) and limb!1
1¡2¯(b)
2(1¡¯(b)) = 1
2; and therefore provided that
½ < 1
2; ! > 0 for b large enough.




V B¢2¡V B are
¡
V G¢




and only the positive root is relevant, given that V G ¸ V B by assumption; therefore,
@¦1(b)
@b <
0 for any V G > V B +
p
!V B
! : Note that V B +
p
!V B
! increases with ¯ (and then decreases with
b) and limb!1 V B +
p
!V B
! = V B +
p
(1¡2½)V B




it is possible to ¯nd a threshold level for b such that
@¦1(b)
@b < 0 when b grows above the
threshold.
Proof of Proposition 5
Straightforward calculations yield r¤ = V G (1 ¡ ¯(b))(1 ¡ ½); and
@¦1(b)
@b = ¡¯0(b)(1 ¡ r¤)(1 ¡ ½)V G
¡ @r¤
@b (1 ¡ ¯(b))(1 ¡ ½)V G: After some manipulations it is possible to show that
@¦1(b)
@b < 0
provided that V G > 1
2(1¡¯(b))(1¡½); note that 1
2(1¡¯(b))(1¡½) increases with ¯ (and then decreases
with b), and limb!1
1
2(1¡¯(b))(1¡½) = 1
2(1¡½): Therefore, 8V G > 1
2(1¡½)there exists a ^ b such that
@¦1(b)
@b < 0 for any b > ^ b:
27